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Abstract
The equity market home bias occurs when the investors over-invest in their home
country assets. The equity market home bias is a paradox because the investors are not
hedging their risk optimally. Even with unrealistic levels of risk aversion, the equity mar-
ket home bias cannot be explained using the standard mean-variance model. We propose
ambiguity aversion to be the behavioral explanation. We design six experiments using
real world assets and derivatives to show the relationship between ambiguity aversion
and home bias. We tested for ambiguity aversion by showing that the investor’s subjec-
tive probability is sub-additive. The result from the experiment provides support for the
assertion that ambiguity aversion is related to the equity market home bias paradox.
JEL classification numbers: C91, G11, G15.
Key words: Equity Market Home Bias. Mean-Variance Model. Ambiguity Aversion.
Experiments.
Ambiguity Aversion in Asset Market: Experimental
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Noah Myung†
1 Introduction
Equity Home Bias is a phenomenon in which investors over-invest in home country assets
compared to what the rational model predicts. Despite the fact that, in the past 4 years,
foreign stocks have been outperforming domestic stocks on average, US investors still
maintain a domestic-asset-heavy portfolio. Home bias is not limited to US investors but
occurs worldwide (Figure 1). There has been strong empirical support for the existence
of home bias paradox and many scholars have made various arguments trying to explain
this puzzle. The inflation rate, exchange rate, information asymmetry, and information
immobility are some of the popular choices but none of these have been generally accepted
or empirically consistent. However, these explanations are all within a rational choice
framework. Here, we propose a behavioral framework, ambiguity aversion, to help better
understand the cause of equity market home bias. Simply put, we argue that ambiguity
aversion inhibits people from investing in unfamiliar companies. Unlike previous studies,
we use an experimental design with real world assets and test for ambiguity aversion
instead of using fictitious assets or simply showing home bias without an explanation.
Equity market home bias1 presents an interesting problem because the investors are
being “irrational” in the sense that they are not investing in a pareto-optimal manner:
there exists another portfolio allocation such that the investor does not face any higher
risk (variance) but receives higher expected return. If people are indeed being irrational
with their portfolio selection, then this presents an arbitrage opportunity. In addition, the
irrational behavior raises the question of why investors are not allocating risks efficiently.
Our paper shows that 1) using real world assets there is home bias, and 2) the bias is
∗I owe many thanks to Ming Hsu, Colin Camerer, Peter Bossaerts, John O’Doherty, David Grether,
Jaksa Cvitanic and Eileen Chou for their helpful comments and discussions. The experiments were
graciously funded by Colin Camerer. I also thank Walter Yuan for introducing me to the world of PHP,
MySQL and Apache server. I am grateful to seminar participants at Caltech, ESA International Meeting
and BDRM Conference. Existing errors are my sole responsibility.
†Email: noah.myung@caltech.edu. Phone: 626-395-8772. Web: www.hss.caltech.edu/∼noah and at
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business and Public Policy starting Fall 2009.
1We will drop the term “equity” from here on out.
caused by ambiguity aversion by showing that the investor’s subjective probability over
foreign assets is sub-additive.
A common argument against ambiguity aversion is that an investor might want to
invest in familiar companies because he knows how well the company will perform (i.e.,
informational advantage). Surely, rational choice theorists cannot use that as an argu-
ment with the Efficient Market Hypothesis looming over it (Fama 1970). However, as
an outsider of the firm, it is highly unlikely that the investor has any useful knowledge.
The term “familiarity” that the investor generally refers to is related to being able to
answer nontechnical questions such as “What does the firm produce? Where are they
located?” However, these things should be irrelevant when it comes to investing. As with
the standard finance approach, what the investor truly needs to know is the expected
cash flow and not what the company produces.2
The insights obtained through the study of home bias also help in explaining other
similar behavioral phenomena. For example, an employee often times invests in the same
company in which he works. However, this is not an optimal way to hedge one’s risk.
When Enron collapsed, the employees who also invested in Enron took a double loss by
failing to insure themselves against risk. In a non-investment environment, our model
can help explain some of the everyday consumer purchasing behavior, such as buying a
toothpaste. Consumers are willing to pay the extra premium in order to buy toothpaste
from a brand which is more familiar. Although our study is focused on the international
asset market, the same phenomenon is applicable across contexts.
Figure 1: Portfolio Weights: US, Japanese and UK Investors
French and Poterba (1991)
2In terms of efficient market hypothesis, the prices should have already incorporated relevant infor-
mations.
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1.1 Literature Review
In addition to French and Poterba (1991), many others have documented empirical sup-
port of home bias. Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2003) show that in 1997 the US
stocks composed only 48.3% of the worlds stock portfolio yet US investors portfolios
were composed of only 10.1% foreign stocks. Therefore, when considering the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with the parameters specified using the world market, US
investors are holding less than 1/5th of the foreign assets required to achieve the efficient
frontier. Even in experimental setting, Kilka and Weber (2002) have shown the existence
of home bias in Germany and United States.
To justify the discrepancy between the empirics and the rational model, a number of
explanations have been suggested. One explanation is that there is capital immobility due
to institutional structure. However, international barriers have been decreasing for the
last 30 years yet there is no significant change in the US investors’ portfolio. Moreover,
most of the portfolio diversification can be obtained by trading in American Depositary
Receipts (Errunza, Hogan, and Hung 1999). Also, we observe that the gross equity flow
has increased while the net flow stayed constant (Bekaert and Harvey 1995). Glassman
and Riddick (2001) showed that informational asymmetry cannot be a good explanation
unless we are assuming that the market portfolio standard deviation is 2 to 5 times higher
than what is empirically shown. Explanation using exchange rate bias is not plausible
with CAPM because one can hedge the exchange rate risk by shorting risk free assets in
foreign countries. Even without hedging, optimal portfolio shows that investors should
diversify even with exchange rate risk. Another explanation is that the investors are
trying to hedge the risk of inflation rate. However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) suggest
that this too is not a plausible explanation unless one assumes a very high level of risk
tolerance. Lastly, in theory, information asymmetry and immobility can help explain
home bias (Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp Forthcoming 2008) but one needs to assume
that there is relevant information gained by non-professional traders. For more detailed
review, see Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Lewis (1999).
The study reported here provides a behavioral explanation of the home bias paradox.
From the behavioral economics point of view, ambiguity aversion is a very good starting
point as an explanation for the home bias paradox. For example, Bossaerts, Ghirardato,
Guanaschelli, and Zame (2005) showed that asset markets do react to ambiguity aversion
with fictitious assets. Our research is an experimental study which shows a positive
relationship between ambiguity aversion and home bias. In particular, the experiments
tested whether investors are more ambiguous when it comes to foreign stocks and how
this relates to the level of home bias. Our experiments are built on Ellsberg (1961)’s
example of showing ambiguity aversion.
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1.2 Agenda
We begin by introducing the theory behind the mean-variance model and its implications,
followed by various theories of ambiguity aversion, and non-additive subjective probabil-
ity model we used for the experimental design. We present experimental results directly
after presenting the design for all six experiments. First two designs target decision-
making over individual companies while the last two designs target decision-making over
indices. We end with a summarizing conclusion.
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2 Theory
A short review of ambiguity aversion and the mean-variance model is discussed in the
following two subsections. Readers who are familiar with the topic may go directly to
the experimental design section. However, our experimental design is heavily based on
the non-additive probability discussed in the Theory of Ambiguity Aversion section.
2.1 Mean-Variance Model and Empirical Data
We follow the argument made by Lewis (1999). The standard model used in finance is
the mean-variance model. The utility function is called the mean-variance utility when
it increases with respect to mean and decreases with respect to variance. In particular,
it has the following form: U = U(EtWt+1, V ar(Wt+1)) where Wt is the wealth at time
t, V ar(•) is the variance-covariance matrix and Et is the expectations operator taken
at time t. Furthermore, assume that ∂U
∂Wt
> 0 and ∂
2U
∂W 2t
< 0. Denote αt, βt as the
proportion of wealth held in domestic and foreign assets at time t, respectively. Hence
αt + βt = 1. Define rt = (r
D
t , r
F
t ) as turn on domestic assets and foreign assets at
time t. For example, one may consider the following utility function with all the desired
properties: Wt(1+Etrt+1)−γV ar(WtEtrt+1) where γ is the risk aversion parameter. Now,
solving for the first order condition of the objective function, the optimal proportion of
foreign holding is:
βt =
(Etr
F
t+1 − EtrDt+1)/γ
var(rF − rD) +
σ2D − σ2FD
var(rF − rD) (1)
where γ = −2WtU2
U1
is the relative risk aversion.
Consider the result from Equation 1. As the level of relative risk aversion increases,
foreign investment decreases. However, there is a bound on how little one should invest
in foreign companies. In particular, the bound is
σ2D−σ2FD
var(rF−rD) , which is empirically greater
than zero. Table 1 shows how much one should hold in foreign assets for a given relative
risk aversion.
Using the empirical data provided from Table 1 and optimal foreign holdings by
Equation 1, even as relative risk aversion goes to infinity, one should still invest 39.5%
of his shares in foreign assets. However, we observe approximately only 8% of the total
investments are directed to foreign assets. Hence, using the mean-variance model, even
with unrealistic amount of risk aversion, the level of home bias cannot be explained.
2.2 Theory of Ambiguity Aversion
Decision theorists have defined and modeled ambiguity in several ways. The most intu-
itive way of defining ambiguity is that the individual is uncertain about the distribution
of the risk (Knight 1921). More uncertain the individual is about the distribution implies
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Summary Statistics of Returns
US Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK EAFE
Mean 11.14 9.59 11.63 11.32 5.81 14.03 12.62 12.12
SD 15.07 18.66 23.33 20.28 26.18 22.50 23.97 16.85
Correlations
US 1.00 0.70 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.26 0.51 0.48
Canada - 1.00 0.43 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.52 0.49
France - - 1.00 0.60 0.42 0.39 0.54 0.65
Germany - - - 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.62
Italy - - - - 1.00 0.38 0.35 0.51
Japan - - - - - 1.00 0.36 0.86
UK - - - - - - 1.00 0.71
EAFE - - - - - - - 1.00
Foreign Portfolio Shares in Percent of Wealth
Actual γ = 1 γ = 2 γ = 3 γ = 10 Minimum Variance
β 8.00 75.9 57.7 51.6 43.1 39.5
Table 1: Summary Statistics of International Equity Market
Data are from Morgan Stanley, from Jan 1970 to Dec 1996
a higher level of ambiguity. For example, the probability distribution of a coin toss has
very little ambiguity (close to 50/50) but the probability distribution of the weather in
Tajikistan (without looking it up on the internet) is pretty uncertain. To say that a
person is ambiguity averse is to say that a person prefers to bet on an event where he
knows more about the distribution. For example, I would rather bet on whether the
next coin toss will turn up heads than bet on whether the weather in Tajikistan today
is between 40-50 degrees.
Although seemingly intuitive, formal modeling of ambiguity has taken many different
approaches. One model assumes that the utility from ambiguous events are less than
the utility from unambiguous events (Sarin and Winkler 1992, Smith 1969). Another
approach lets the weights of ambiguous probability be different from the weights on
unambiguous probability when calculating the expected utility (Einhorn and Hogarth
1985, Segal 1987). Epstein (1999) states that there are multiple priors to the probability
distribution. Another popular model often used, similar to the multiple priors approach,
provides a range of probability for an event (i.e., probability of X ∈ [0.3, 0.7]) instead
of a point mass probability (i.e., probability of X = 0.5) (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989).
The approach we use is from Schmeidler (1989) which is derived from Choquet (1953-
1954), where we relax the assumption that the probability must add up to 1. We call
this approach the non-additive probability approach.
In non-additive probability approach, we keep the assumption that the probabilities
are monotonic (p(E) ≤ p(F ) if E ⊆ F ) but not necessarily additive (p(E ∪ F ) 6= p(E) +
p(F )− p(E ∩ F )). In this model, we measure the level of ambiguity by the level of sub-
6
additivity. In other words, while p(A) and p(B) are the likelihood of the events A and
B, 1 − p(A) − p(B) measures the lack of “faith” in those likelihoods. Therefore, bigger
sub-additivity (1− p(A)− p(B)) implies higher levels of ambiguity.
Again, an interested reader may refer to Camerer and Weber (1992) for more detailed
discussion and Epstein (1999) for more rigorous treatment.
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3 Materials and Methods
A total of 55 people participated in this experiment; 47 were graduate and undergraduate
students from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and 8 were not Caltech
affiliates. The participants were recruited using the Social Science Experimental Labo-
ratory (SSEL) announcement system and public fliers. All participants were registered
subjects with SSEL (signed a general consent form) and this experiment was approved as
an exemption by the local research ethics committee. The experiment was conducted at
the SSEL located at Caltech, Pasadena, CA. The lab consists of 30 working computers
divided into a cubical setting. Subjects were physically prevented from viewing another
student’s computer screen. The subjects were paid a show-up fee of $10 in addition to
extra earnings based on their performance in the experiment.
The experimental designs dealing with individual companies (experiments 1-4) were
programmed using PHP3 and MySQL4 and are divided into four parts plus a survey sec-
tion. The experimental designs dealing with indices (experiments 5-6) were programmed
using E-prime5 and are divided into two parts plus a survey section. Instructions were
given prior to each section and were available both in print as well as on screen. We
quizzed the subjects after the instruction to insure they understood the experiment. The
instructions provided to the participants are attached as an Appendix.
3www.php.net
4www.mysql.com
5www.pstnet.com/products/E-Prime
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4 Control Experiment: Ellsberg Paradox
4.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
We used the Ellsberg’s standard two urns and two colored balls experiment as the control
treatment (Ellsberg 1961). An ambiguous urn, urn 1, contains 100 balls with unknown
distribution of red and black. A risky urn, urn 2, contains 100 balls of which 50 are
red and 50 are black. There is risk with urn 2 while uncertainty with urn 1. This
baseline treatment is conducted to obtain an approximation of which of the investors are
ambiguity averse and not ambiguity averse. The experimental structure below depicts
how we go about in eliciting preference for ambiguity.
4.2 Experimental Structure
Ellsbergs experiment was administered to the investors in the following manner:
1. Investor is presented with two urns.
(a) Urn 1 contains 100 balls but the number of black or red balls is unknown.
(b) Urn 2 contains 100 balls, of which 50 are black and 50 are red.
2. Setting one: Investor is asked to pick from the following two gambles.
(a) $x dollar if red ball is drawn from urn 1.
(b) $x dollar if red ball is drawn from urn 2.
(c) Indifferent.
3. Setting two: Investor is asked to pick from the following two gambles.
(a) $x dollar if black ball is drawn from urn 1.
(b) $x dollar if black ball is drawn from urn 2.
(c) Indifferent.
We determined whether the investor is ambiguity averse or not by the choices he
makes in this Ellsberg experiment. In particular, if the investor chooses the gamble from
urn 2 (risky urn) in both settings, then we inferred that the investor was ambiguity averse.
By choosing urn 2 in the first setting, it implies that the expected utility from gamble
two is greater than the expected utility from gamble one. If the investor chooses urn 2
in the second setting, it implies that the expected utility from the gamble two is greater
than gamble one. The following proposition will show why this leads to sub-additive
probability, and therefore, ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 4.1 Under the expected utility maximization framework, choosing the risky
urn in both setting implies sub-additive probability measure.
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Proof : Choosing gamble two in the first setting implies that
p(red ball|urn 2)u($x) > p(red ball|urn 1)u($x)
⇐⇒
p(red ball|urn 2) > p(red ball|urn 1) (2)
Choosing gamble two in the second setting implies that
p(black ball|urn 2)u($x) > p(black ball|urn 1)u($x)
⇐⇒
p(black ball|urn 2) > p(black ball|urn 1) (3)
Since urn 2 has 50 black and 50 red balls, it must be that p(black ball|urn 2)+p(red ball|urn 2) =
1. From Equation 2 and 3, this implies that p(black ball|urn 1) + p(red ball|urn 1) < 1,
which leads to a sub-additive probability measure.
4.3 Results
From the Ellsberg’s urn experiment, we found 48.65% of the subjects to be ambiguity
averse. We classified the subject as ambiguity averse if he chose option (b) in both
settings one and two. If the subject chose a mixture of (a), (b) or (c), this classified
him as undetermined, choosing option (a) in both settings classified him as ambiguity
preferred, and choosing option (c) in both settings classified him as ambiguity neutral.
Refer to Table 2 to see the complete breakdown. For the rest of the paper, when we
refer to an ambiguity averse subjects, we are referring to the 48.65% of the subjects who
were classified as ambiguity averse. We refer to the complement of the ambiguity averse
population as the non-ambiguity averse subjects.6 One caveat is that, just as people
show different risk preference (although correlated) for different tasks, the same holds
true for ambiguity preference for different tasks.
Type Proportion (%)
Ambiguity Averse 48.65
Ambiguity Neutral 37.84
Ambiguity Preferred 2.70
Undetermined 10.81
Number of Obs: 37
Table 2: Sample Population’s Classification of Ambiguity Preference
6We do not have records of the results on the Ellberg’s urn experiment for subjects from session 1 of
the indices experiment due to technical error.
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5 Experiment 1: Portfolio Building
Definition 1 A derivative is called a Digital Option if it provides a fixed return after
reaching the strike price on the maturity date.
A digital option is often called an Arrow Security by economists. Consider the follow-
ing example of a digital option. A digital call option with strike price k and payment r is
denoted as C(r, k) which pays zero if the stock price s < k and r if s ≥ k at the maturity
date. A digital put option with strike price k and payment r is denoted as P (r, k) which
pays zero if the stock price s > k and r if s ≤ k at the maturity date.
5.1 Setup for Individual Stocks, Experimental Summary, and
Motivation
A motivation for this experiment is to test whether there is home bias in our sample, as
well as how the company choices are correlated with ambiguity aversion. We presented
a collection of 23 domestic and 27 foreign companies to the investor in a random order.
These companies were all from the technology and semiconductor industry to minimize
the industry bias. In addition, these are companies listed as the 50 biggest companies in
the world with respect to their industry by Forbes 2004 magazine.7 Along with a company
name the investors were given their company’s ticker symbol, headquarter location, as
well as a brief list of company information which was provided by finance.google.com.
Investors were asked to choose 15 companies to place a digital put option order and 15
companies in a digital call option order. One option was given per company chosen by
the investor. These digital options had a maturity date of one week and strike price equal
to the stock price at the day of the experiment. The investors were restricted from using
any tools other than the software required for the experiment. In addition, the investors
were not allowed to list a company for both a put and a call option. The investors were
paid based on the performance of their portfolio after the maturity date of the options
which paid $0.50 per option exercised.
This study answers two major questions. 1. Do investors show signs of home bias?
2. What is the relationship between ambiguity aversion and home bias? We expect to
see the proportion of domestic companies chosen to be greater than 23/50 = 46%. In
addition, we expect to see a positive correlation between the level of home biasness and
ambiguity.
7“Biggest company” was measured by a composite of sales, profits, assets, and market value. The
list spans 51 countries and 27 industries.
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5.2 Results
Refer to Figure 2 for the average portfolio composition. We tested the hypothesis of
home bias. On average, US companies comprised 52.70% (SE=3.05) of the call options
and 49.21% (SE=2.54) of the put options, which gave a total of 50.95% (SE=1.30)
investment in US companies. The investors were no more likely to choose call options
for US companies nor were they more likely to choose a put option for US companies.
Given that the US companies consisted of only 46% of the possible companies available
to choose, this suggests that there is a home bias level of 4.95% where the differences
are significant at p < 0.01. This is a modest result but this may be caused by the fact
that the experiment limits the industry choice and investors are required to choose 30
companies.
Despite the fact that half of our subjects were considered to be ambiguity averse from
Ellsberg’s experiment, we do not find a difference between the ambiguity averse and non-
ambugity averse individual when it came to levels of home bias in their portfolio. In fact,
we did not find any correlation between the result from the Ellsberg treatment and total
composition of one’s portfolio.
Figure 2: Share of US Companies in Portfolio
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6 Experiment 2: Bond or Options?
6.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
In this experimental design, the investor was shown one company at a time and was asked
to choose one of the three gambles. Gamble 1 is to receive a bond which pays $1 one week
later, Gamble 2 is to receive a digital call option with exercise value $1 and Gamble 3 is
to receive a digital put option with exercise value $1. These options are identical to the
previous section minus the exercise value. However, the investor also faced a known risk
in a sense that, having chosen gamble 1, he has P probability of actually receiving the
bond. Also, by choosing a gamble 2 or 3, he has 1− P probability of actually receiving
the options. In this setting, the probability of receiving the security of choice becomes
an implied cost: lower the probability implies a higher cost. (Refer to the experimental
instructions for a detailed example.)
Each investor gets three domestic companies with P = 33%, three foreign companies
with P = 33%, three domestic companies with P = 29% and three foreign companies
with P = 29%. The companies were randomly selected for each investor. Investors were
paid based on the performance of every trial. After completing the entire experiment
(after part 4), the investors were asked for the level of familiarity of these 12 companies
in the survey section.
Implied assumption is that the subjective probability belief over the stock prices is
independent of the probability of receiving the security (bond and options). With this
assumption, Proposition 2 claims that regardless of the belief over the performance of
the stocks, choosing a bond will imply that the investor is exerting ambiguity aversion
(via sub-additive probability).
Proposition 6.1 With any probability p < 33% in the above setting, selecting a bond
will lead to a sub-additive probability measure. In addition, as p decreases, the level of
sub-additivity of the probability measure increases, which implies higher level of ambiguity
aversion.
Proof : Denote x as an event of receiving the bond and y as an event of receiving the
option. Denote v as an event of increase in price and w as an event of decrease in price
of the company’s stock. By assumption, p(y ∩ v) = p(y)p(v) and p(y ∩ w) = p(y)p(w).
bond  put ⇐⇒ p(x)u($) > p(y ∩ v)u($)= p(y)p(v)u($) ⇒p(x) > p(y)p(v) hence
p(x)/p(y) > p(v). Similarly, bond  call ⇐⇒ p(x)/p(y) > p(w). We observe that
p(w) + p(v) < 2p(x)/p(y). If p < 33%, then we have p(w) + p(v) <66/67 < 1, hence sub-
additive probability measure. Notice as p decreases, 2p(x)/p(y) also decreases. Therefore,
the level of sub-addivity of the probability measure increases as p decreases.
This section addresses four major questions: 1. Is there a difference in the level of
familiarity between domestic and foreign companies? 2. What is the relationship between
the level of familiarity and individual choices? 3. Are investors more likely to show higher
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levels of ambiguity aversion in foreign companies compared to the domestic companies?
And most importantly, 4. Are ambiguity averse investors more likely to choose bonds
than others?
6.2 Results
This section provides the most significant result out of all designs related to individual
companies.
The familiarity of companies were coded using the following method. Investors were
asked during the survey section to state the level of familiarity from “never heard of it”,
“not familiar”, “somewhat familiar”, “familiar”, and “very familiar.” We then coded the
dummy variable using 1 to 5 from “never heard of it” to “very familiar” in increasing
order (µ = 2.18, σ = 1.30).
Table 3 presents a simple relationship from the experimental data. In particular, it
addresses whether there is a relationship between familiarity and individual choices. We
see that investors are indeed more familiar with US companies than foreign companies
(ρ = 0.24, p < 0.01). Next, we obtain a significant correlation between investment
decision and ambiguity classification (ρ = −0.16, p < 0.01). This states that people who
were classified as ambiguity averse are more likely to choose to receive a bond in this
experimental treatment. Table 3 suggests that the type of option chosen (call vs put)
is not influenced by ambiguity aversion, country origin of asset, level of ambiguity, or
familiarity.
Refer to the graph in Figure 3. Here, we present the percentage that an option was
chosen instead of a bond. On average, we find that an option was chosen in 73% of the
trials. We further divide the group to compare the decisions made by ambiguity averse
and non-ambiguity averse individuals, and then further divided the sample by focusing
on domestic and foreign assets. First, we observe that investors classified as ambiguity
averse are more likely to choose an option compared to non-ambiguity averse investors
(µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.81 6= 0.67 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.01). Furthermore, we observe
that ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to receive a bond over option when faced
with foreign companies (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.85 6= 0.71 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.1) or
US companies (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.77 6= 0.62 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.1). Therefore,
Figure 3 supports our theory and shows that ambiguity averse individuals are more likely
to select a bond, in turn, showing a higher rate of sub-additivity in probability.
Next, we divide the sample to see the aggregate rate of option chosen for different
levels of familiarity between ambiguity averse and non-ambiguity averse individuals in
Figure 4. While we do not find significant difference between rate of option chosen
between ambiguity averse and non-ambiguity averse investors for high levels of familiarity
(≥ 3), we find significant differences when the familiarity is low. This is expected since
ambiguity aversion is more salient when the asset is not familiar. When familiarity level is
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1, we find that µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.87 6= 0.65 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.01, which means
ambiguity averse investors are more likely to choose a bond conditioning on familiarity
level being 1. When familiarity level is 2, we also find a statically significant differences:
µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.81 6= 0.58 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.1. Again, these results support
our theory: when people are unfamiliar with an asset, it creates higher rate of ambiguity,
in turn, they are more likely to choose a bond. When people are familiar with an asset,
the two class of investors behave in a similar manner.8
Table 4 represents three different random-effects logistical regression models. All
three regressions takes the following functional form in Equation (4):
decisionij = α + β1ambiguity aversei + β2us assetj + β3high ambiguity + β4familiarityij
(4)
where i is the index for the individuals and j is the index for the companies. For example,
familiarityij means individual i’s familiarity for company j. For the random-effects model,
we panel the data by individual i: therefore, the number of groups equal the number of
subjects and each panel contains all the choices made by that particular individual.
The three different regression models are: All Assets, Familiar Assets, and Unfamiliar
Assets. As the names indicate, we restrict our attention to a subset of observations for
those analyses. Familiar Assets restricts attention to assets with familiarity levels 3 to
5 while Unfamiliar Assets are restricted to familiarity levels 1 and 2. The decisionij
variable took a value of 1 if the investor i chose to receive an option for company j
and 0 if a bond. Ambiguity averse took a value of 1 if the individual i was classified as
ambiguity averse, 0 otherwise. US asset is a dummy variable representing whether the
company j is from US. High ambiguity is also a dummy variable, taking a value of 1
during P = 29 treatment. Lastly, familiarity took a value ranging from 1 to 5, least to
most familiar.
From All Assets regression, we find that investors are more likely to choose to receive
an option when familiarity is higher (β4 = 0.262, p < 0.1). As expected, familiarity
plays a even a stronger and positive role when an asset is familiar (β4 = 1.584, p < 0.05
under Familiar Assets regression), and it is not significant when it comes to Unfamiliar
Assets regression. In other words, familiarity matters when the investor is familiar with
the asset and the relationship is positive. The high ambiguity independent variable is
positive in all 3 regressions, which means that investors are more likely to select an option
if the required level of sub-additivity increases. Notice that the US assets independent
variable is significant under All Assets and Unfamiliar Assets regressions only (p <
0.05). Furthermore, the coefficients are negative: βallassets2 = −0.765 > βunfamiliarassets2 =
−0.848. This suggests that people are more ambiguity averse when it comes to unfamiliar
US assets compared to unfamiliar foreign assets. This observation is also supported in
Figure 3 by showing a higher rate of selecting the bond option for US compared to foreign
assets. The key is that the β2 is significant for the unfamiliar assets. Lastly, consider
the independent variable titled ambiguity averse. This variable takes 1 if the investor is
8Although not statistically significant, what we observe is that with familiar assets, ambiguity averse
individuals are more likely to take the option than the bond compared to non-ambiguity averse people.
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classified as ambiguity averse and 0 otherwise. Under the All Assets regression, it has
a weakly significantly and negative coefficient (β1 = −1.015, p < 0.15 two-tailed test),
which correctly suggests that ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to take the
bond over the asset. Furthermore, the ambiguity averse variable is not significant when
it comes to Familiar Assets regression, since people are indeed not ambiguous when it
comes to these assets. Lastly, when considering the Unfamiliar Assets regression, we
obtain a even more negative and statistically significant coefficient, as one would expect
if our theory were to hold true (β1 = −1.275, p < 0.05).
In summary, our data suggests that: 1. subjects are more familiar with the US assets,
2. subjects are more likely to choose a bond when they are less familiar with the company,
3. subjects do not show higher rate of ambiguity aversion to foreign assets per se; they
are ambiguity averse towards less familiar companies which are more likely to be foreign,
4. in fact, subjects are more likely to dislike unfamiliar US assets compared to unfamiliar
foreign assets and 5. subjects who are classified as ambiguity averse are more likely to
choose a bond.
Ambiguity US High Familiarity Decision Option
Averse Asset Ambiguity Type
Ambiguity Averse 1
US Asset 0 1
High Ambiguity 0 0 1
Familiarity -0.05 0.24*** 0.02 1
Decision -0.16*** -0.10 0.31*** 0.07 1
Option Type 0.11 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 . 1
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Number of Obs: 252. Number of Obs for Optiontype: 185
Table 3: Correlation Relationship
Ambiguity Averse: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. US Asset: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. High Ambiguity: 1 if P = 29%, 0 if P = 33%
Familiarity: from 1-5. Decision: 1 if Option, 0 if Bond. Option Type: 1 if Call, 0 if Put
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Figure 3: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Origin of Assets
Figure 4: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Familiarity
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse. Fi: Familiarity level i
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Dependent Variable: Decision = 1 if Option and 0 if Bond
Ind. Variables All Assets Familiar Assets Unfamiliar Assets
Constant 0.899 -4.343** 1.762*
(0.631) (2.201) (0.942)
Ambiguity Averse -1.015# -0.112 -1.275**
(0.679) (0.876) (0.621)
US Asset -0.765** -0.873 -0.848**
(0.358) (0.747) (0.431)
High Ambiguity 1.989*** 1.930** 1.544***
(0.392) (0.761) (0.462)
Familiarity 0.262* 1.584** -0.060
(0.158) (0.683) (0.518)
Log likelihood -116.919 -40.682 -77.758
All Assets: Number of Obs: 252. Number of Groups: 21
Familiar Assets: Number of Obs: 91. Number of Groups: 21
Unfamiliar Assets: Number of Obs: 161. Number of Groups: 21
#p<0.15, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Table 4: Random-Effects Logit Regression: Decision
Variables are defined in the same manner as Table 3
Familiar Assets model restricts attention to assets with familiarity level greater than 2
Unfamiliar Assets model restricts attention to assets with familiarity level less than 3
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7 Experiment 3: Company Preference
7.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
In this part of the experiment, the investors are shown two companies (A and B) and
asked to choose one of the three gambles: Gamble 1 : A outperforms B, Gamble 2 : B
outperforms A and Gamble 3: A equals B. The term outperform means that the percent
change in the company’s stock price is higher than the other companys percent change
one week from the day of the experiment. For the purpose of payment, we randomly
selected one of the trials the investor went through and paid $5 if he made the correct
choice.
The key to this experiment is how the two companies are populated. Recall that from
experiment 1, the investor specified his portfolio. Using this portfolio, the experiment is
programmed to ask for comparison between US companies with put requests and foreign
companies with call requests. In addition, the experiment also asked for a comparison
between US companies with call requests and foreign companies with put requests. Given
that the investor requested a put option for one company and a call option for another
company, he should take the gamble which states the call company will outperform the
put company. If the investor selects the US company which he requested a put option for
over the foreign company which he requested a call option for, by the proposition below,
the investor is showing ambiguity aversion against the foreign company.
Proposition 7.1 After choosing a put option for company A and a call option for com-
pany B, stating that company A will outperform company B leads to a sub-additivity in
probability measure.
Proof : Denote v as an event of increase in price and w as an event of decrease in price
of the company’s stock price. Having chosen a put option for company A implies that
p(w|A) > p(v|A). Having chosen a call option for company B implies that p(v|B) >
p(w|B). Stating that company A will outperform company B implies that p(v|A) >
p(v|B). Since p is a probability measure, highest p(v|A) can be is 1/2. Therefore,
1/2 > p(v|B) > p(w|B) hence p(v|B) + p(w|B) < 1.
This design addresses the following major questions. 1. Do the investors consistently
prefer the US companies over the foreign companies? 2. Are the investors who showed
signs of ambiguity aversion during the Ellsberg setting (experiment 1) more likely to
choose US (put) companies over foreign (call) companies?
7.2 Results
In short, we do not find any statistically significant results from this experimental study.
To support that there is sub-additive probability beliefs towards foreign companies,
one would expect to see a higher rate of choosing US put over foreign call gambles
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compared to choosing foreign put over US call gambles. In our data, when investors were
making a decision between US put company and foreign call company, investors preferred
the US put over foreign call 22.59% (SE=4.58%) of the time (Figure 5). In other words,
the investors exhibited sub-additivity 22.59% of the time. However, when faced with US
call and foreign put, investors preferred the foreign put 25.74% (SE=3.45%) of the time.
The difference is not statistically significant.
As presented below, we further divided the observation by ambiguity category (Figure
5), portfolio composition (Figure 6), and conducted various regression analyses (Table
5). However, we did not find any significant result to support our theory.
The two possible explanation for the results we observed are: 1. familiarity and 2.
risk hedging. The result we observe here may be due to higher familiarity of foreign
companies shown over the US companies. The survey of familiarity of the companies
chosen during the portfolio building section was not taken and cannot be tested.
Another possible explanation which we can infer from the data is that the investors
were hedging their risk. Since the mean share of US companies in the investor’s portfolio
is 51%, we can split the investors into two types: US-heavy investors who have over
51% of US companies in their portfolio and US-light investors who have less than 51%.
Then, from Figure 6 we observe that among the US-heavy investors, they are much more
likely to prefer foreign put over US call (p < 0.1). However, this difference disappears
when we only consider the US-light investors. Since the investors over-invested in US
assets during the portfolio building section, they may have decided to under-invest in
company comparison section since these are exactly the same companies they previously
invested in. This type of experimental spill-over is a potential drawback of having the
same subject participate in the various treatments.
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Figure 5: Company Comparison Choices Made: By Ambiguity
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse
Figure 6: Company Comparison Choices Made: By Portfolio
US-heavy: Portfolio consists of more than 51% US companies. US-light: Portfolio consists of less than 51% US companies
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Dependent Variables Independent Variable:
Constant Ambiguity Averse
US-Heavy US Put over Foreign Call 0.143* 0.067
(0.077) (0.109)
Number of Obs: 9. R2: 0.0507
US-Heavy Foreign Put over US Call .379*** -0.153
(0.074) (0.110)
Number of Obs: 9. R2: 0.2157
US-Light US Put over Foreign Call 0.169 0.167
(0.106) (0.138)
Number of Obs: 12. R2: 0.1271
US-Light Foreign Put over US Call 0.116** 0.173**
(0.050) (0.065)
Number of Obs: 12. R2: 0.4125
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5: Regressions: Company Comparison Choices Made
US-heavy: Portfolio consists of more than 51% US companies. US-light: Portfolio consists of less than 51% US companies
8 Experiment 4: Position Holding
Definition 2 A position is a vector θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Rn, where n is the number of
companies available and θi denotes the number of shares of company i.
Definition 3 Holding a short position means that the investor has done the following
procedure. The investor borrowed the share from another investor and sold it today at
today’s price. Then the investor will buy back the share in the future and return the
borrowed share to the original owner.
One should short a share if he believes that the stock price will drop in the future.
The payoff from short position: pricetoday − pricefuture.
Definition 4 Holding a long position means that the investor has done the following
procedure. The investor borrowed cash to buy the stock today at today’s price. Then the
investor will sell the stock in the future and pay back the borrowed money.
One should long a share if he believes that the stock price will increase in the future.
The payoff long position: pricefuture − pricetoday
Example: θ = (1, 2,−4, 2) with companies Q =(Microsoft, Dell, Shell, IBM). The
holding from this position is θQT which indicates that the investor holds a long position
on 1 share of Microsoft, 2 shares of Dell, shorted 4 shares of Shell and holds a long
position on 2 shares of IBM.
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Definition 5 The preference relation  satisfies the sure-thing principle if for any
subset E ⊂ S, (x1, ..., xS), (x′1, ..., x′S), (x1, ..., xS) and (x′1, ..., x′S) are such that 1. For
all s /∈ E: xs = x′s and xs = x′s and 2. For all s ∈ E: xs = xs and x′s = x′s then
(x1, ..., xS)  (x′1, ..., x′S) ⇐⇒ (x1, ..., xS)  (x′1, ..., x′S).
8.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
This experiment provides a method for testing the behavior of the investor in the multiple
companies setting. This can be seen as investing in funds (such as mutual funds). In this
experiment, the investor was asked to choose between taking a position that is shown
or taking a bond. We will first discuss the concept behind this experiment and then
discuss the exact implementation in the experimental structure section. This experiment
is structured in the following manner. The investor was given a list of domestic posi-
tions θD 6= (0, ...0) ∈ Rn. We then went through several iterations and determined the
investor’s preference between the position and bond. Then we asked for the investor’s
preference between θ = (θD, θF ) and a bond, where θF ∈ RM is a position in foreign
companies. Again we went through several iterations in this setting. Lastly, we asked
for the investor’s preference between θ∗ = (θD,−θF ) and a bond. For the purpose of
payment, an investor was paid from a randomly selected trial and was paid based on
the performance of the choice. If a position was selected, investor was paid based on
the performance of the position. We capped the earnings at $10 while the minimum was
bounded at $0 for the purpose of the experiment.
The data allows us to test whether the investor’s preferences are consistent. In other
words, if the investor preferred θD over the bond but preferred the bond over θ = (θD, θF ),
then he should prefer θ∗ = (θD,−θF ) over the bond. Otherwise, he is violating the sure-
thing principle (Savage 1954).9 Same argument applies to the setting in which the investor
prefers bond over θD, θ = (θD, θF ) over the bond and θ
∗ = (θD,−θF ) over the bond.
8.2 Experimental Structure
This is divided into two phases. This section is written to provide a detailed explanation
of what actually occurred during the experiment and may be skipped. The overview was
explained in the previous section.
Phase 1: Single US and Single Foreign Company
1. Randomly select a US company listed under the call option from experiment 1.
(a) Ask for preference between the positive position of this company and a bond.
(b) Repeat this procedure until “position” choice is selected.
9Note that the violation of the sure-thing principle is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
ambiguity aversion.
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2. Randomly select a foreign company.
(a) Ask for preference between a positive position from the US company from 1-b
and negative position from the foreign company.
(b) Repeat this procedure until the “bond” choice is selected.
3. Reverse the position for the foreign company from 2-b and ask for preference be-
tween the bond and the position.
Phase 2: Two US and Two Foreign Companies
1. Randomly select 2 US companies (without replacement) and give one a positive
and one a negative position.
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Repeat this 4 times.
2. Randomly select 2 foreign companies (without replacement), give one positive and
one negative position, and pair this with one of the pairs from 1 (without replace-
ment).
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Do this for all 4 pairs
3. Reverse the foreign company’s position from 2.
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Do this for all 4 pairs
This section addresses the following two major questions: 1. Do investors violate the
sure-thing principle in the multiple companies setting? 2. If so, who are more likely to
violate the sure-thing principle?
8.3 Results
In this section, each investors provided 5 data points.10 Each data point is a binary result
of whether the investor violated the sure-thing principle. On average, investors violated
the sure-thing principle 0.81 times (SE = 0.164), hence violated the sure thing principle
approximately 1 out of 5 times. These violations of sure-thing principle supports the
argument that investors are ambiguity averse towards foreign assets.
Judging by the regression in Table 6, investors are more likely to violate the sure-thing
principle in the position experiment if they are ambiguity averse (β = 4.920, p < 0.10).
10This is because a series of choices only provides 1 observation.
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This result again supports the theory that ambiguity aversion does play a role in home
bias. However, US-heavy investors are less likely to violate the sure-thing principle if
they are also ambiguity averse (β = −9.367, p < 0.10), which is consistent with the
results from the third experimental design (company comparison).
Dependent Variable: Position
(number of times sure-thing principle was violated)
Ind. Variables Constant Ambiguity US Assets AmbiguityXUS Assets
Averse
-0.404 4.920* 2.109 -9.367*
(1.811) (3.303) (3.430) (6.516)
Number of Obs: 21. R2: 0.1278
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (One-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 6: Regression: Violation of Sure-Thing Principle
US Asset: % of US companies in investor’s portfolio
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9 Experiment 5: Portfolio Building with Indices
9.1 Setup for Indices
Thus far we have focused on individual companies. We will shift our focus to indices
for the next two experimental designs. Both setup and the experimental designs for the
indices treatment are similar to the setup and the designs for the individual companies.
There are several reasons why we need to consider both indices as well as individual
companies. First, average investors tend to discuss and invest at a company level for daily
trading. However, when the average investors are planning a retirement plan through
financial advisors, they tend to invest in indices that are provided by the holding company.
Secondly, people are more familiar with the companies than indices. In other words, there
is less of a company-level effect or company-level informational advantage, since indices
are composed of hundreds of different companies. Therefore, showing ambiguity aversion
at the indices level may provide a stronger case of home bias. We are interested to learn
whether the ambiguity aversion is concentrated only at the individual company level or
if it is also present at the index level.
For the indices treatment, we have selected 25 domestic and 25 foreign major indices
defined by Bloomberg11 which varied in capitalization size as well as industry focus. All
the investors were initially provided with a web-based prospectus. The prospectus was
created using data provided by Bloomberg which included summarization of the index,
value of the index for the past three months and their trading volume. The sample
instructions, screen shots, and the list of indices are provided in the appendix.
9.2 Experimental Summary and Motivation
A motivation for this design is to test whether there is home bias in investment behavior
when dealing with indices. Investors were shown indices one by one and were asked to
build their portfolio. A total of 25 domestic and 25 foreign indices were shown in a
random order. For each of the indices, they were given 3 options: buy the index, sell the
index, or receive a bond instead. The investors were paid based on the performance of
their portfolio 7 days after the experiment was concluded. The payment structure was:
• If bond: $1.00
• If buy: $1.00 + (20× r)
• If sell: $1.00− (20× r)
where r is the return from the index. Although we did not use the term, they were
actually going long or short on the indices. The returns were multiplied by a factor of
20 to stimulate long term investment.
11www.bloomberg.com
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This study answers the following major questions: 1. Is there home bias when invest-
ing in indices? 2. Are investors more familiar with US indices? 3. Are people more likely
to buy, sell, or receive a bond with US assets? 4. Do ambiguity averse investors have
different portfolio composition? Overall, what is the relationship between familiarity,
ambiguity aversion, and investment choices?
9.3 Results
First, just as with the individual company treatment, investors are indeed more familiar
with the US indices than the foreign indices. When investors were asked to rate the
familiarity of each index from 1-6, 1 being least and 6 being most familiar, the average
familiarity for US indices was 2.057 (SE = 0.032) and for foreign indices was 1.268
(SE = 0.018), significantly different at p < 0.01. In fact, the correlation of familiarity
is stronger for indices (ρ = 0.364, p < 0.01) than for individual companies (ρ = 0.24,
p < 0.01).
Three random-effects regressions are presented in Table 7 for Bond, Sell and Buy as
the functional form in Equation (5):
choiceij = α + β1us indexj + β2index familiarityij + β3ambiguity aversej (5)
where i is the index for the individuals and j is the index for the indices. Bond, Sell and
Buy variables take 1 if the investor chose to receive the respective choice, 0 otherwise.
US index is a dummy variable taking 1 for an US index. Index familiarity ranged from
1-6 as stated above. The ambiguity averse variable takes 1 if the investor was classified
as ambiguity averse via Ellsberg’s experiment, 0 otherwise.
The Bond regression’s significant coefficient is only for the index familiarity (β2 =
−0.029, p < 0.1), which states that investors are more likely to take the bond choice if
they are less familiar with the index. This is consistent with findings from the individual
company treatment. The Sell regression and the Buy regressions also have one variable
that is statistically significant and it is for dummy variable US Index: β1 = −0.193,
p < 0.01 for Sell and β1 = 0.185, p < 0.01 for Buy. This suggests that investors are much
more likely to buy a US asset while less likely to sell a US asset. This is consistent with
a home biased investor.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 presents the composition of investor’s portfolio. Overall, we
find that investors are more likely to buy than to receive a bond or sell (p < 0.01)
although the difference in bond and selling is not significantly different. The biggest
contrast appears when comparing US indices to foreign indices. There is no significant
differences when comparing the ratio of selling and bond for US indices but investors
are much more likely to buy US indices: composed over 50% of the portfolio (p < 0.01).
However, the investment ratio is more evenly spread out when it comes to foreign indices.
There is no significant difference when comparing buying and selling behavior for the US
indices. When we divide the observation to high familiarity (familiarity level > 2) to low
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familiarity (familiarity level ≤ 2, investors are much more likely to choose to buy than
to sell or receive a bond with in both categories (p < 0.01). Furthermore, investors have
higher ratio of bond when it comes to low familiarity indices compared to familiar indices
(p < 0.01). Lastly, with respect to ambiguity averse to non-ambiguity averse investors,
we find that non-ambigity averse investors are much less likely to take the bond option
(p < 0.1). However, there is no significant difference in the ratio of buying indices, but
ambiguity averse investors have higher ratio of selling (p < 0.05).
We conclude that investors are: 1. indeed home biased (more buying and less selling
in US indices), 2. more familiar with US indices, 3. more likely to buy familiar indices,
4. ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to receive a bond, and 5. more likely to
receive a bond when faced with unfamiliar indices.
Dependent Variable
Ind. Variables Bond Sell Buy
Constant 0.304*** 0.394*** 0.303***
(0.065) (0.042) (0.059)
US Index 0.006 -0.193*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.038)
Index Familiarity -0.029* 0.023 0.007
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Ambiguity Averse 0.062 -0.084 0.022
(0.093) (0.053) (0.081)
Overall R2 0.0095 0.0435 0.0389
Number of Obs: 792. Number of Groups: 16.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 7: Random-Effects Regression: Portfolio Composition with Indices
IV: US: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. Index Familiarity: from 1-6 least to greatest. Ambiguity Averse: 1 if true, 0 otherwise
DV: Bond: chose Bond. Sell: chose Sell. Buy: chose Buy
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Figure 7: Composition of Portfolio for Indices
Average SE = 0.0178. Maximum SE = 0.0266
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Figure 8: Composition of Portfolio for Indices
Average SE = 0.0178. Maximum SE = 0.0266
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10 Experiment 6: Bond or Options with Indices
10.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
The design for this experiment is similar to the Bond or Options experiment under the
individual companies treatment. The investors were shown series of indices one at a time
and were given three possible choices just as in the stock treatment:
• Receive a bond which pays $1.00 with probability P .
• Receive a digital call option with exercise value of $1.00 with probability 1− P .
• Receive a digital put option with exercise value of $1.00 with probability 1− P .
However, there are two differences. First, we used indices instead of companies: 25
domestic and 25 foreign, which were presented in random order. Second, we varied
the value of P , the known risk of receiving the actual derivative. Instead of focusing
only on P = 33% or P = 29% as in the individual companies treatment, we varied
the P ∈ {30, 32, 34, 36} for the indices treatment. Note that we are in a super-additive
subjective probability measure once P ≥ 34%.
This study answers the following major questions. What is the relationship between
familiarity, ambiguity aversion, and investment choice?
10.2 Results
Table 8 presents several random-effects logistical regression models. We regress sub-
additive cases, super-additive cases, and all cases with the following two functional forms:
decisionij = α + β1us indexj + β2familiarityij + β3P-level (6)
and
decisionij = α + β2familiarityij (7)
Table 8 details the dependent variables. Consistent with our findings thus far, we find
that people are more likely to take the option with more familiar indices (see model (1),
(2), (4), and (5)). The significance disappears once we focus only on the super-additive
cases and this is expected (see model (3) and (6) in Table 8). Furthermore, model (1)
shows that people are also more likely to take the option with a US index compared to
foreign index.
Unlike the case with the individual companies, we do not get a strong result when an-
alyzing the data by ambiguity and origin of indices (see Figure 9). The difference in rate
of choosing an option is not statistically different when we divide our observation by US
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indices only and foreign indices only. Furthermore, even in the aggregate level, the differ-
ence is only marginally significant (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.89 6= 0.84 = µambiguity averse,
p < 0.15, two-tailed t-test).
Figure 10 compares the decisions divided by ambiguity classification of the investors
and their familiarity level for the indices. Consistent with the results from the individual
companies, we do find that investors are more likely to take the bond (in turn, showing
sub-addivity in subjective probability), when it comes to unfamiliar assets compared to
non-ambiguity averse investors. This difference, again disappears appropriately when we
focus the observation to familiar indices.
In summary, although not as strong as the individual company treatment, we find
that subjects show ambiguity aversion when it comes to investing in unfamiliar indices.
Figure 9: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Origin of Indices
Sub-addivity cases only: P ∈ {30, 32}
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Figure 10: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Familiarity for Indices
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse
Familiar if familiarity level > 2. Otherwise, Unfamiliar. Sub-addivity cases only: P ∈ {30, 32}
11 Conclusion
We started out this research to show that ambiguity aversion is a possible candidate
for explaining home bias paradox despite what the rational choice model suggests. We
designed experiments that used real world assets and prices. We then used the concept
of sub-addivity to show whether an investor’s choices expressed ambiguity aversion. Our
experimental data supports the theory that ambiguity aversion partly explains home bias
phenomena.
Overall, experiment 5 (Portfolio Building with Indices) provided the strongest support
for home bias in our lab environment and experiment 2 (Bond or Options with individual
companies) provided the strongest support that ambiguity aversion helps to explain some
part of home bias behavior.
In quick summary, we classified about 50% of the participants as ambiguity averse
by using the Ellsberg’s urn experiment. Portfolio building with individual companies
showed a modest size in home bias. Bond or Options with individual companies exper-
iment showed that investors do show higher rate of ambiguity aversion (sub-additivity
in probability) when it comes to unfamiliar assets, and the investors are more familiar
with US assets. The company preference experiment failed to show significant results
which we contribute to spill-over effect from the portfolio building experiment. The posi-
tion holding experiment demonstrated that investors do violate the sure-thing principle
approximately 20% of the time, and ambiguity averse investors are even more likely to
violate the principle. Portfolio building with indices provided evidence that there is home
bias in our laboratory setting; investors prefer to buy familiar indices and are more famil-
34
iar with US indices. Lastly, Bond or Options with Indices experiment also showed that,
even with indices, investors exhibit higher rate of ambiguity aversion when investing with
unfamiliar indices.
Overall, the results provided here show positive support that ambiguity aversion as
a partial explanation of home bias phenomenon. As Camerer and Karjalainen (1994)
stated, methodologically, “this kind of work is difficult” and that even these modest size
(sub-addivity of less than 5%) in ambiguity aversion “could have important economic
consequences” (pp. 348 - 349). Therefore, we are quite content with our modest result
provided through our experiment, and hopeful for future research.
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12 Appendix
12.1 Instructions for Individual Companies
The following 4 pages are sample instructions used in the experiment.
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k  
p r
i c
e .
 O
t h
e r
w
i s
e ,
 y
o u
 w
i l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
$ 0
.  I
f  y
o u
 c
h o
o s
e  
t o
 r e
c e
i v
e  
a  
c a
l l  
o p
t i o
n ,
 t h
e n
 
y o
u  
h a
v e
 a
 6
7 %
 c
h a
n c
e  
o f
 r e
c e
i v
i n
g  
i t  
a n
d  
3 3
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
o f
 r e
c e
i v
i n
g  
n o
t h
i n
g .
 N
o t
e  
t h
a t
 w
h e
n  
y o
u  
d o
 
a c
t u
a l
l y
 r e
c e
i v
e  
a  
p u
t  o
p t
i o
n ,
 y
o u
 a
r e
 n
o t
 g
u a
r a
n t
e e
d  
t o
 b
e  
p a
i d
 $
1  
u n
l e
s s
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e  
o n
e  
w
e e
k  
f r
o m
 
t o
d a
y  
i s
 l e
s s
 t h
a n
 t o
d a
y '
s  p
r i c
e .
 S
e e
 t h
e  
t a
b l
e  
b e
l o
w
 t o
 g
e t
 a
 b
e t
t e
r  u
n d
e r
s t
a n
d i
n g
 o
f  t
h e
 p
a y
o f
f .  
I f
 y
o u
 s e
l e
c t
 a
 
B
o n
d  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 l e
s s
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  w
e e
k '
s  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 g
r e
a t
e r
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  
w
e e
k '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
3 3
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 1
 
$ 1
 
6 7
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 0
 
$ 0
 
 I f
 y
o u
 s e
l e
c t
 a
 C
a l
l  
o p
t i o
n  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 l e
s s
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  
w
e e
k '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 g
r e
a t
e r
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  
w
e e
k '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
3 3
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 0
 
$ 0
 
6 7
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 0
 
$ 1
 
 
4  
I f
 y
o u
 s e
l e
c t
 a
 P
u t
 
o p
t i o
n  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 l e
s s
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  
w
e e
k '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
T o
d a
y '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
i s
 g
r e
a t
e r
 t h
a n
 n
e x
t  
w
e e
k '
s  s
t o
c k
 p
r i c
e  
3 3
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 0
 
$ 0
 
6 7
%
 c
h a
n c
e  
$ 1
 
$ 0
 
T h
i s
 i s
 h
o w
 t h
e  
" c
h a
n c
e "
 i s
 d
e t
e r
m
i n
e d
 i n
 t h
i s
 s e
c t
i o
n .
 I f
 i t
 s t
a t
e s
 t h
a t
 t h
e r
e  
i s
 a
 4
5 %
 c
h a
n c
e  
o f
 r e
c e
i v
i n
g  
a  
b o
n d
,  i
t  m
e a
n s
 t h
e  
f o
l l o
w
i n
g :
 w
e  
w
i l l
 u
s e
 a
 r a
n d
o m
 n
u m
b e
r  g
e n
e r
a t
o r
 w
h i
c h
 g
i v
e s
 a
 n
u m
b e
r  f
r o
m
 1
 -  
1 0
0 .
 
I f
 t h
e  
n u
m
b e
r  g
i v
e n
 i s
 f r
o m
 1
 -  
4 5
,  y
o u
 w
i l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
t h
e  
b o
n d
.  O
t h
e r
w
i s
e ,
 y
o u
 w
i l l
 n
o t
.  A
g a
i n
,  i
f  i
t  s
t a
t e
s  
t h
a t
 t h
e r
e  
i s
 a
 5
5 %
 c
h a
n c
e  
o f
 r e
c e
i v
i n
g  
a n
 o
p t
i o
n ,
 i t
 m
e a
n s
 t h
e  
f o
l l o
w
i n
g :
 w
e  
w
i l l
 u
s e
 a
 r a
n d
o m
 n
u m
b e
r  
g e
n e
r a
t o
r  w
h i
c h
 g
i v
e  
a  
n u
m
b e
r  f
r o
m
 1
 -  
1 0
0 .
 I f
 t h
e  
n u
m
b e
r  i
s  f
r o
m
 4
6  
-  1
0 0
,  y
o u
 w
i l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
t h
e  
o p
t i o
n .
 
E a
c h
 t r
i a
l s
 a
r e
 i n
d e
p e
n d
e n
t  o
f  e
a c
h  
o t
h e
r .  
T h
i s
 m
e a
n s
 t h
a t
 w
e  
w
i l l
 r u
n  
t h
e  
r a
n d
o m
 n
u m
b e
r  g
e n
e r
a t
o r
 e
a c
h  
t i m
e  
f o
r  e
a c
h  
t r i
a l
 y
o u
 h
a v
e  
i n
 t h
i s
 s e
c t
i o
n .
 
A
n y
 q
u e
s t
i o
n s
?  
 
P a
r t
 3
.  C
o m
p a
n y
 P
r e
f e
r e
n c
e  
I n
 t h
i s
 p
a r
t  o
f  t
h e
 e
x p
e r
i m
e n
t ,  
y o
u '
l l  
b e
 s h
o w
n  
t w
o  
c o
m
p a
n y
 n
a m
e s
 ( A
 a
n d
 B
)  a
n d
 w
i l l
 b
e  
g i
v e
n  
t h
r e
e  
g a
m
b l
e s
 t o
 c
h o
o s
e  
f r
o m
 ( s
e e
 s c
r e
e n
 s h
o t
 b
e l
o w
) .  
F i
r s
t  c
h o
i c
e  
i s
 a
 b
e t
 t h
a t
 c
o m
p a
n y
 A
 w
i l l
 o
u t
 p
e r
f o
r m
 
c o
m
p a
n y
 B
 i n
 o
n e
 w
e e
k  
f r
o m
 n
o w
.  N
e x
t  c
h o
i c
e  
i s
 a
 b
e t
 t h
a t
 c
o m
p a
n y
 B
 w
i l l
 o
u t
p e
r f
o r
m
 c
o m
p a
n y
 A
 i n
 o
n e
 
w
e e
k  
f r
o m
 n
o w
.  L
a s
t  c
h o
i c
e  
i s
 a
 b
e t
 t h
a t
 c
o m
p a
n y
 A
 a
n d
 B
 w
i l l
 p
e r
f o
r m
 t h
e  
s a
m
e .
 Y
o u
 a
r e
 a
l s
o  
g i
v e
n  
a  
b u
t t o
n  
" c
l i c
k  
h e
r e
 t o
 v
i e
w
 c
o m
p a
n y
 i n
f o
" .
 P
r e
s s
 t h
i s
 b
u t
t o
n  
a n
d  
y o
u  
w
i l l
 b
e  
g i
v e
n  
t h
e  
c o
m
p a
n y
 i n
f o
 f o
r  
t h
e s
e  
s p
e c
i f i
c  
c o
m
p a
n i
e s
.  
P a
y o
f f
:  U
s i
n g
 a
 r a
n d
o m
 n
u m
b e
r  g
e n
e r
a t
o r
,  w
e  
w
i l l
 r a
n d
o m
l y
 s e
l e
c t
 o
n e
 o
f  t
h e
 t r
i a
l s
.  Y
o u
 w
i l l
 b
e  
p a
i d
 
b a
s e
d  
o n
 t h
e  
p e
r f
o r
m
a n
c e
 o
f  t
h e
 t r
i a
l  s
e l
e c
t e
d :
 i f
 t h
e  
g a
m
b l
e  
y o
u  
c h
o s
e  
i s
 t h
e  
w
i n
n e
r ,  
y o
u  
w
i l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
$ 5
.  
O
t h
e r
w
i s
e ,
 y
o u
' l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
n o
t h
i n
g .
 
 
T h
e  
t e
r m
 "
o u
t p
e r
f o
r m
"  
i s
 d
e f
i n
e d
 a
s  f
o l
l o
w
s :
 c
o m
p a
n y
 A
 o
u t
 p
e r
f o
r m
s  c
o m
p a
n y
 B
 i f
 a
n d
 o
n l
y  
i f  
t h
e  
i n
c r
e a
s e
 i n
 p
e r
c e
n t
a g
e  
o f
 t h
e  
d o
l l a
r  v
a l
u e
 o
f  c
o m
p a
n y
 A
' s  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e  
i s
 h
i g
h e
r  t
h a
n  
t h
e  
p e
r c
e n
t a
g e
 i n
c r
e a
s e
 
o f
 t h
e  
d o
l l a
r  v
a l
u e
 o
f  c
o m
p a
n y
 B
' s  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e .
 T
h e
 t i
m
e  
i n
 w
h i
c h
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e s
 a
r e
 t a
k e
n  
w
i l l
 b
e  
t h
e  
s a
m
e  
a s
 i n
 p
a r
t  1
.   
 
5  
E x
a m
p l
e 1
 :  
A
 =
 I n
t e
l  a
n d
 B
 =
 I B
M
.   
  
T o
d a
y '
s  p
r i c
e  
N
e x
t  w
e e
k '
s  p
r i c
e  
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
 c
h a
n g
e  
A
 
$ 1
0 0
 
$ 1
0 1
 
1 %
 
B
 
$ 5
0  
$ 5
1  
2 %
 
I n
 t h
e  
t a
b l
e  
a b
o v
e ,
 y
o u
 w
o u
l d
 h
a v
e  
m
a d
e  
t h
e  
c o
r r
e c
t  c
h o
i c
e  
i f  
y o
u  
c h
o s
e  
" B
 o
u t
p e
r f
o r
m
s  A
" .
 
  
T o
d a
y '
s  p
r i c
e  
N
e x
t  w
e e
k '
s  p
r i c
e  
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
 c
h a
n g
e  
A
 
$ 1
0 0
 
$ 1
0 1
 
1 %
 
B
 
$ 5
0  
$ 4
9  
-  2
%
 
I n
 t h
e  
t a
b l
e  
a b
o v
e ,
 y
o u
 w
o u
l d
 h
a v
e  
m
a d
e  
t h
e  
c o
r r
e c
t  c
h o
i c
e  
i f  
y o
u  
c h
o s
e  
" A
 o
u t
p e
r f
o r
m
s  B
" .
 
A
n y
 q
u e
s t
i o
n s
?  
 
P a
r t
 4
.  P
o s
i t i
o n
 H
o l
d i
n g
s .  
I n
 t h
i s
 p
a r
t  o
f  t
h e
 e
x p
e r
i m
e n
t ,  
y o
u  
w
i l l
 b
e  
s h
o w
n  
a  
l i s
t  o
f  c
o m
p a
n i
e s
 a
n d
 a
 p
o s
i t i
o n
 h
e l
d .
 Y
o u
 w
i l l
 b
e  
a s
k e
d  
i f  
y o
u  
p r
e f
e r
 t o
 k
e e
p  
t h
e  
c u
r r
e n
t  p
o s
i t i
o n
 o
r  a
 b
o n
d .
 S
e e
 s
c r
e e
n  
s h
o t
 f o
r  a
n  
e x
a m
p l
e .
 A
 p
o s
i t i
o n
 i s
 a
 p
o r
t f o
l i o
 
c o
n s
t r u
c t
e d
 w
i t h
 b
o t
h  
p o
s i
t i v
e  
a n
d  
n e
g a
t i v
e  
s h
a r
e s
 o
f  t
h e
 c
o m
p a
n y
 s t
o c
k .
 W
h e
n  
y o
u  
h a
v e
 a
 p
o s
i t i
v e
 s h
a r
e ,
 
i t  
m
e a
n s
 t h
a t
 y
o u
 h
a v
e  
b o
r r
o w
e d
 m
o n
e y
 t o
d a
y  
t o
 b
u y
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
( a
t  t
o d
a y
' s  
p r
i c
e )
 a
n d
 w
i l l
 s e
l l  
i t  
i n
 t h
e  
f u
t u
r e
 
t o
 p
a y
 b
a c
k  
t h
e  
l o
a n
.  N
e g
a t
i v
e  
s h
a r
e  
m
e a
n s
 y
o u
 h
a v
e  
b o
r r
o w
e d
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
t o
 s e
l l  
i t  
t o
d a
y  
( a
t  t
o d
a y
' s  
p r
i c
e )
 
a n
d  
w
i l l
 b
u y
 i t
 b
a c
k  
i n
 t h
e  
f u
t u
r e
 ( a
t  t
h e
 f u
t u
r e
 p
r i c
e )
 t o
 r e
t u
r n
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
t o
 t h
e  
o w
n e
r .  
S e
e  
e x
a m
p l
e  
b e
l o
w
 t o
 
s e
e  
h o
w
 t h
e s
e  
w
i l l
 a
c t
u a
l l y
 w
o r
k .
 A
 b
o n
d  
i s
 a
 r i
s k
 f r
e e
 a
s s
e t
,  m
e a
n i
n g
,  i
t  w
i l l
 p
a y
 $
x  
i n
 o
n e
 w
e e
k  
r e
g a
r d
l e
s s
 
o f
 t h
e  
o u
t c
o m
e  
o f
 t h
e  
p o
s i
t i o
n .
 I n
 t h
i s
 s e
t t i
n g
,  y
o u
 w
i l l
 o
n l
y  
w
o r
k  
w
i t h
 o
n e
 s h
a r
e  
p e
r  c
o m
p a
n y
.  I
n  
s u
m
m
a r
y ,
 
y o
u  
w
a n
t  t
o  
h a
v e
 a
 n
e g
a t
i v
e  
s h
a r
e  
i f  
y o
u  
b e
l i e
v e
 t h
a t
 t h
e  
p r
i c
e  
w
i l l
 d
r o
p  
a n
d  
a  
p o
s i
t i v
e  
s h
a r
e  
i f  
y o
u  
b e
l i e
v e
 
t h
a t
 t h
e  
p r
i c
e  
w
i l l
 i n
c r
e a
s e
.  I
f  y
o u
 b
e l
i e
v e
 t h
a t
 t h
e  
t o
t a
l  r
e t
u r
n  
f r
o m
 y
o u
r  p
o s
i t i
o n
 i s
 g
o i
n g
 t o
 b
e  
l e
s s
 t h
a n
 $
x ,
 
w
h e
n  
y o
u  
s h
o u
l d
 c
h o
o s
e  
t h
e  
b o
n d
.   
 
A
g a
i n
,  y
o u
 a
r e
 a
l s
o  
g i
v e
n  
a  
b u
t t o
n  
" c
l i c
k  
h e
r e
 t o
 v
i e
w
 c
o m
p a
n y
 i n
f o
" .
 P
r e
s s
 t h
i s
 b
u t
t o
n  
a n
d  
y o
u  
w
i l l
 b
e  
g i
v e
n  
t h
e  
c o
m
p a
n y
 i n
f o
 f o
r  t
h e
s e
 s p
e c
i f i
c  
c o
m
p a
n i
e s
.   
 
6  
 
H
o w
 t o
 C
a l
c u
l a
t e
 y
o u
r  p
a y
o f
f s
 b
y  
h o
l d
i n
g  
y o
u r
 p
o s
i t i
o n
:  
T
o  
c a
l c
u l
a t
e  
y o
u r
 p
r o
f i t
 w
i t h
 p
o s
i t i
v e
 s h
a r
e :
 N
e x
t  w
e e
k '
s  p
r i
c e
 -  
T
o d
a y
' s
 p
r i
c e
 =
 p
r o
f i t
.   
T
o  
c a
l c
u l
a t
e  
y o
u r
 p
r o
f i t
 w
i t h
 n
e g
a t
i v
e  
s h
a r
e :
 T
o d
a y
' s
 p
r i
c e
 -  
N
e x
t  w
e e
k '
s  p
r i
c e
 =
 p
r o
f i t
.  
P a
y o
f f
:  U
s i
n g
 a
 r a
n d
o m
 n
u m
b e
r  g
e n
e r
a t
o r
,  w
e  
w
i l l
 s e
l e
c t
 o
n e
 o
f  t
h e
 t r
i a
l s
.  I
n  
o n
e  
w
e e
k ,
 y
o u
 w
i l l
 b
e  
p a
i d
 
b a
s e
d  
o n
 t h
e  
p e
r f
o r
m
a n
c e
 o
f  t
h e
 s e
l e
c t
e d
 p
o s
i t i
o n
.  T
h e
 B
o n
d  
w
i l l
 p
a y
 $
x  
d o
l l a
r s
 i n
 o
n e
 w
e e
k ,
 r e
g a
r d
l e
s s
 o
f  
t h
e  
o u
t c
o m
e  
o f
 t h
e  
p o
s i
t i o
n .
 $
x  
d i
f f
e r
s  b
e t
w
e e
n  
t r i
a l
 a
n d
 w
i l l
 b
e  
s p
e c
i f i
e d
 a
c c
o r
d i
n g
l y
 d
u r
i n
g  
t h
e  
t r i
a l
s .  
S i
n c
e  
t h
i s
 i s
 a
n  
e x
p e
r i m
e n
t ,  
y o
u  
w
i l l
 n
o t
 h
a v
e  
t o
 p
a y
 a
n y
t h
i n
g  
b a
c k
 i f
 y
o u
 e
n d
 u
p  
o w
i n
g  
m
o n
e y
 b
y  
h o
l d
i n
g  
y o
u r
 p
o s
i t i
o n
.  T
h e
r e
f o
r e
,  t
h e
 w
o r
s e
 y
o u
 c
a n
 d
o  
w
i t h
 a
 p
o s
i t i
o n
 h
o l
d i
n g
 i s
 z
e r
o  
w
h i
c h
 i s
 s t
i l l
 s t
r i c
t l y
 l e
s s
 
t h
a n
 w
h a
t  y
o u
 w
i l l
 r e
c e
i v
e  
w
i t h
 b
y  
h o
l d
i n
g  
t h
e  
b o
n d
.  I
n  
a d
d i
t i o
n ,
 t h
e  
m
a x
i m
u m
 t h
a t
 a
 p
o s
i t i
o n
 c
a n
 p
a y
 o
f f
 
w
i l l
 b
e  
l i m
i t e
d  
a t
 $
1 0
.  
T h
e  
t i m
e  
i n
 w
h i
c h
 t h
e  
s t
o c
k  
p r
i c
e s
 a
r e
 t a
k e
n  
w
i l l
 b
e  
t h
e  
s a
m
e  
a s
 i n
 p
a r
t  1
.  
E x
a m
p l
e  
o f
 w
h a
t  a
 p
o s
i t i
v e
 s h
a r
e  
m
e a
n s
:  
T o
d a
y :
 P
r i c
e  
o f
 T
o y
o t
a  
s h
a r
e  
i s
 $
5 0
.  
N
e x
t  w
e e
k :
 P
r i c
e  
o f
 T
o y
o t
a  
s h
a r
e  
i s
 $
4 0
 
Y
o u
r  p
r o
f i t
 =
 $
4 0
 -  
$ 5
0  
=  
-  $
1 0
 
E x
a m
p l
e  
o f
 w
h a
t  a
 n
e g
a t
i v
e  
s h
a r
e  
m
e a
n s
:  
T o
d a
y :
 P
r i c
e  
o f
 T
o y
o t
a  
s h
a r
e  
i s
 $
5 0
.  
N
e x
t  w
e e
k :
 P
r i c
e  
o f
 T
o y
o t
a  
s h
a r
e  
i s
 $
4 0
 
Y
o u
r  p
r o
f i t
 =
 $
5 0
 -  
$ 4
0  
=  
$ 1
0  
  
 
7  
E x
a m
p l
e :
 ( -
 M
i c
r o
s o
f t ,
 +
 I n
t e
l ,  
-  I
B
M
,  +
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i c
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d d
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e  
p a
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 c
o l
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o f
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i l l
 p
r o
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e v
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 c
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s e
 t h
e  
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n d
 i n
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e a
d ,
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o u
 w
o u
l d
 h
a v
e  
r e
c e
i v
e d
 $
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r e
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r d
l e
s s
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a p
p e
n  
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t h
e  
p o
s i
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n .
 
I n
 s u
m
m
a r
y ,
 t a
k e
 t h
e  
b o
n d
 i f
 y
o u
 b
e l
i e
v e
 t h
a t
 t h
e  
s u
m
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f  t
h e
 p
a y
o f
f  b
y  
h o
l d
i n
g  
t h
e  
p o
s i
t i o
n  
i s
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o i
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 b
e  
l e
s s
 t h
a n
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x .
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t h
e r
w
i s
e ,
 t a
k e
 t h
e  
p o
s i
t i o
n .
 
A
n y
 q
u e
s t
i o
n s
?  
 
C
l i c
k  
h e
r e
 w
h e
n  
i n
s t
r u
c t
e d
 t o
 d
o  
s o
 b
y  
t h
e  
e x
p e
r i m
e n
t e
r .  
12.2 Screenshot for Individual Companies
The following page is a sample screenshot from the experiment.
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t  
 
 
12.3 Instructions for Indices
The following 5 pages are sample instructions and screenshots used in the experiment.
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n c
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e c
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e c
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 b
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x p
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i m
e n
t .  
I f
 y
o u
 
l i s
t e
n  
c a
r e
f u
l l y
 a
n d
 m
a k
e  
g o
o d
 d
e c
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i d
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 c
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 b
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a d
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e c
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i c
e s
 w
i l l
 b
e  
r e
c o
r d
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 b
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i c
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 c
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i c
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e d
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e c
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 b
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 b
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y m
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 d
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i c
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n d
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i m
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a c
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n c
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x c
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n d
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i m
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 b
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i d
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l d
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 c
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n d
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o c
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 b
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 b
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p l
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e l
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 c
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n d
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e d
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 c
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0 .
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t m
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 b
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u c
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 b
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n d
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r o
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p l
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t c
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e d
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 c
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n d
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n d
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 b
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n d
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n d
 i t
 l o
s t
) ,  
a n
d  
1  
f o
r  X
Y
Z  
( y
o u
 t o
o k
 
t h
e  
b o
n d
) .  
  
 F i
n a
l l y
,  b
e c
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p l
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 b
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 p
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. c
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 p
a r
t  o
f  t
h e
 e
x p
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